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INDIANA’S UNIFORM SCHOOL SYSTEM, THE
RIGHT TO LITERACY, AND REMOTE
LEARNING IN A PANDEMIC
Jesse Smith*

I.

SCHOOL FEES PERMITTED UNDER THE
INDIANA CONSTITUTION

Indiana is one of eight states that permit
schools to charge fees for student textbooks and
other curricular materials. 1 While providing
assistance for low-income families who meet
eligibility, these fees can result in hundreds of dollars
* Jesse Smith is currently a third-year law student at
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law and lives
in Indianapolis with his wife and two children. Jesse currently
serves on the Indiana Law Review as a Note Development Editor.
He was selected as a Most Outstanding Clinical Law Student for
2020-2021. Jesse is an active member of the American
Constitution Society and previously served as president of the
McKinney chapter. Upon successful completion of the bar, Jesse
will join Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse as an associate
attorney.
1
Matt McKinney & Stephanie Wade, 42 states don’t
charge you for textbooks in public schools. Indiana does., WRTV
(Jan. 29, 2018, 10:41 AM),
https://www.wrtv.com/news/politics/42-states-dont-charge-youfor-textbooks-in-public-schools-indiana-does
[https://perma.cc/W7Y7-9DRD].
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per student. 2 In 2017, “Evansville Vanderburgh
School Corporation officials sued nearly 500 families
and individuals over unpaid balances for textbook
and netbook/laptop rentals, meals and daycare
services.” 3 These charges occur despite the Indiana
Constitution stating that education is to be offered
“wherein tuition shall be without charge[.]” 4 The full
article 8 section 1 clause reads:
Knowledge and learning, generally
diffused throughout a community,
being essential to the preservation
of a free government; it shall be the
duty of the General Assembly to
encourage, by all suitable means,
moral, intellectual,

scientific,
and
agricultural
improvement; and to provide, by
law, for a general and uniform
system of Common Schools,
wherein tuition shall be without
charge, and equally open to all.” 5
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-5-3 (West 2020); Khristine
Albaladejo, Indiana: Get rid of textbook fees for public school
students, INDIANA COALITION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION MONROE
COUNTY (Oct. 17, 2018 8:55 PM), https://www.icpemonroecounty.org/blog/indiana-get-rid-of-textbook-fees-forpublic-school-students [https://perma.cc/7XNE-8UTL].
3
Thomas B. Langhorne, EVSC suing hundreds of student
families, COURIER & PRESS (Dec. 16, 2017, 10:59 AM),
https://www.courierpress.com/story/news/2017/12/16/evsc-suinghundreds-student-families/935142001 [https://perma.cc/BKD8QP58].
4
IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
5
Id.
2
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As will be seen in the case law that has developed,
litigants have challenged what exactly the “tuition
shall be without charge” means. 6
Permissive charges have been expressly
codified as the curricular materials rental program. 7
The governing bodies of each school system in
Indiana select their materials which as of 2013
includes: books, hardware, software, and digital
content. 8 Other than compliance with minimum
educational standards set by the state board, the only
stipulations on the fees charged are that “[t]he annual
rental rate may not exceed twenty-five percent
(25%) of the retail price of the curricular materials.” 9
There is a hardship carveout for “the inability of a
student’s family to purchase or rent curricular
materials, taking into consideration the income of the
family and the demands on the family, the governing
body may furnish curricular materials to the students
without charge[.]” 10 Prior to the changes made to the
statutes to include the technological devices and
software, the statute referenced only textbooks. The
relevant case law has mostly developed in reference
to textbooks, starting most prominently with
Chandler v. South Bend Community School Corp. 11
A. Cases challenging curricular fees under the Indiana
Constitution

6
7

2020).

Id.
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-26-12-1–20-26-12-2 (West

IND. CODE ANN. § 20-18-2-2.7 (West 2020).
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-26-12-2 (West 2020).
10
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-41-2-5 (West 2020).
11
Chandler v. South Bend Community School Corp., 312
N.E.2d 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
8
9

53
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In 1974, the Indiana Court of Appeals
interpreted what the Indiana Constitution meant by
tuition being “without charge” when a schoolgirl
directly challenged her South Bend Community
School’s policy in charging a textbook rental fee. 12
The court did not interpret “tuition” to include
“textbooks used in public schools of the State.”13
Instead, the court defined tuition unambiguously as
“[t]he act or business of teaching the various
branches of learning . . . the act of teaching: the
services or guidance of a teacher: . . . the price of or
payment for instruction.” 14 Notably missing is any
attempt to explain or define how the act of teaching
is carried out. The court dismissed Chandler’s
historical view of schools at and before the 1850
Constitutional Convention because they found no
ambiguity in the term. 15
Furthermore, this decision provides a
contrast between Indiana’s Education Clause and
other states where it has been variably held that
textbooks were considered to be provided as part of
an education “free of charge.” 16 Idaho, Michigan, and
Montana recently held for free textbooks as part of
their constitutions which “include a specific mandate
that the legislature of those states establish a system
of free public or common schools.” 17 In contrast, but
in support of the court’s holding, however, was
Illinois’s Supreme Court finding that even the
mandate requiring free schools still permits them to
charge for textbooks. 18 Textbook rental fees continue
Id. at 916.
Id. at 920.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 917, 922.
17
Id. at 921.
18
Id.
12
13
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as part of Indiana’s education policy to date and now
includes other curricular materials such as laptops
and other digital devices. 19
Where the Indiana Court of Appeals rejected
the historical approach in Chandler, the Indiana
Supreme Court embraced it in full to interpret the
Education Clause in Nagy. 20 In Nagy, the EvansvilleVanderburgh School Corporation imposed a $20 fee
for all students which was used to pay for a multitude
of school activities. 21 If the fee was not paid, a notice
was sent that legal action would be taken. 22 The Court
of Appeals held that the fee amounted to a charge for
tuition in violation of the Indiana Constitution’s
Education Clause. 23 The Indiana Supreme Court
undertook a historical approach noting first the
distinction between what a “free school system”
would imply and what the framers provided with
“tuition shall be without charge.” 24 Dating back to the
period of when the 1850 state constitution was
written and ratified, the Court pitted Caleb Mills,
“referred to as the ‘father of the Indiana common
school system,’” who “argued for a quality education
open to all Indiana children ‘without distinction of
rank or color’ and that ‘our common schools should
be free as the atmosphere we breathe,’” 25 against
Indiana residents that were in opposition. 26 The
Indiana Senate held a referendum during the 1848
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-18-2-2.7 (West 2020).
Nagy ex rel. v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp.,
844 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 2006).
21
Id. at 482-83.
22
Id. at 483.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 484-85.
25
Id. at 485 (quoting Caleb Mills, An Address to the
Legislature of Indiana at the Commencement of its Session (Dec. 7,
1846).
26
Id. at 486.
19
20

55
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elections asking simply, “Are you in favor of free
schools?” 27 Interestingly, “[v]igorous opposition
came from both the wealthiest and poorest economic
classes—both those who had the finest education
money could afford and those who never attended
school.” 28 The referendum passed with 56% in
support, and the framers of Indiana’s second
constitution assembled in 1850 within this
environment and ultimately passed the language that
exists today. 29
The Court found that the text ultimately used
by the committee and framers fell far short of “the
establishment of free schools,” but it was still not
exactly clear what was meant by “tuition” being
“without charge.” 30 If tuition were left solely to the
definition of tuition at the time, the understanding of
what was meant would be that definition expressed
in Chandler. 31 However, this understanding “loses
sight of the entire free school movement debate—a
central and key element of which was that public
schools would be operated largely at public
expense.” 32 The Court held that the determination of
what is provided for in a public education is left to the
legislature and not the courts. 33 It stated:
Where the legislature—or through
delegation of its authority the State
Board—has identified programs,
activities, projects, services or
curricula that it either mandates or
27

Id.
Id. at 486-87.
29
Id. at 486-89.
30
Id. at 488-91.
31
Id. at 490.
32
Id. at 491.
33
Id.
28
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permits school corporations to
undertake, the legislature has made
a policy decision regarding exactly
what qualifies as a part of a uniform
system
of
public
education
commanded by Article 8, Section 1
and thus what qualifies for funding
at public expense. And of course the
legislature has the authority to place
appropriate
conditions
or
limitations on any such funding.” 34

In a footnote, the Court decided that the textbook
rental fee statutory arrangement fit within these
“appropriate conditions or limitations.” 35 But,
because the $20 fee Evansville charged was applied
into the general fund and used for expenses the
legislature had identified as “a part of a publiclyfunded education,” the fee was held to be in violation
of the constitution. 36
In 2010, facing a budget deficit, Franklin
Township
Community
School
Corporation
discontinued transportation services for the majority
of its students. 37 Parents were left with the option of
contracting with a transportation service for $495 for
a single child, or finding alternative transportation. 38
Parents brought a class action suit and shortly
thereafter, the general assembly amended Ind. Code
§ 20-27-5-2 that provided, “no fee may be charged to
a parent or student for transportation to and from
Id. at 492.
Id. at 492 n.12.
36
Id. at 493.
37
Hoagland v. Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 27
N.E.3d 737, 739 (Ind. 2015).
38
Id.
34
35

57
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school.” 39 The section also states that “a school
corporation may provide transportation for students
to and from school.” 40 Relying on Nagy, the Indiana
Supreme Court held that the legislative branch has
“considerable discretion in determining what will
and will not come within the meaning of a public
education system[,]” and that “[the legislature], and
not the courts, are to judge what is the best system.” 41
The court held that because the relevant statute
permitted that schools may provide transportation to
and from school, it was the legislature that permitted
for schools to choose whether or not to provide
transportation altogether, but a fee would not be
permitted. 42
While Hoagland did not find transportation to
and from school necessary to encourage knowledge
and learning that is equally open to all, it did provide
when and under what conditions the courts should
determine if a fee is constitutionally permissive. If a
fee constitutes charging tuition as in Nagy, one in
which the legislature has already determined were
“part and parcel of a public education” (or put
differently: the equivalent of being charged a fee to
attend school), then the fee is not permitted under
the Education Clause. 43 If, however, the General
Assembly has made policy decisions regarding what
constitutes a public education, the Education Clause
gives them wide discretion to determine what is “part
and parcel.” 44 If it is not “part and parcel” then a fee
may be permitted. 45 However, the “wide discretion”
39

Id.
Id. at 740.
41
Id. at 742
42
Id. at 745.
43
Id. at 744.
44
See id. at 748.
45
See id.
40
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afforded to the legislature has its limits, and any
reading of Nagy and Chandler would assume that
such discretion that is afforded to the legislature
would not include permitting a charge for
instruction.
B. Technology in and out of the Classroom: Curricula
or Classroom?

Technology defined broadly can refer to a
number of tools relating to education. 46 The first
definition listed in Merriam-Webster defines
“technology” as: “the practical application of
knowledge.” 47 Dating back centuries, “wooden
paddles with printed lessons, called Horn-Books,
were used to assist students in learning verses.” 48
Over time, the technological method of sharing
information has taken many forms: the Magic
Lantern, the Chalkboard, the pencil, radio, overhead
projector, the Skinner Teaching Machine, the
handheld calculator, etc. 49 Remote learning via other
forms of technology is not an entirely new concept in
relation to health outbreaks. 50 “In 1937, the Chicago

Purdue Online, The Evolution of Technology in the
Classroom, PURDUE UNIVERSITY ONLINE,
https://online.purdue.edu/blog/education/evolution-technologyclassroom (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). [https://perma.cc/W5EZ6VF9]
47
Technology, DICTIONARY.COM https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/technology (last visited Mar. 7, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/9PUD-T7WA].
48
Purdue Online, supra note 45.
49
Id.
50
Katherine A. Foss, Remote learning isn’t new: Radio
instruction in the 1937 polio epidemic, THE CONVERSATION (Oct.
5, 2020) https://theconversation.com/remote-learning-isnt-newradio-instruction-in-the-1937-polio-epidemic-143797
[https://perma.cc/T2SH-D655].
46

59
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school system used radio to teach children during a
polio outbreak.” 51
By the time the personal computer came to
prominence, “the educational world knew that it was
on the verge of greatness.” 52 By 2009, ninety-seven
percent of teachers had one or more computers in
their classroom. 53 Ninety percent of those same
teachers reported using them during instructional
time. 54 By that same year, 195 cyber charter schools
were in operation in twenty-five states serving over
105,000 students. 55 “These schools offer most or all
of their instruction programs over the Internet, and
are not restricted to officially designated, ‘brick and
mortar’ physical locations.” 56
This overview of technology, culminating in
the use of computers in the classroom, highlights the
differences in utilization and capability of technology.
On the one hand, the computer being used mostly as
an instructional tool, and on the other as the main
access point to the classroom for cyber charter
schools. As computers came to prominence, the use
of the computer differed significantly based on one’s
perspective and goals. 57 The computer could be used
to teach work skills in using a computer in which
51

Id.
Id.
53
Lucinda Gray et al., Teachers’ Use of Educational
Technology in U.S. Public Schools: 2009, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
EDUCATION STATISTICS, 5 (2010),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010040.pdf.
54
Id. at 6.
55
Kevin P. Brady et al, Unchartered Territory: The
Current Legal Landscape of Public Cyber Charter Schools, 2010
BYU EDUC. L.J. 191, 195-96 (2010).
56
Id. at 191.
57
Michael Haran, A History of Education Technology,
INSTITUTE OF PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION & LEARNING (May 29,
2015), http://institute-of-progressive-education-and-learning.org/ahistory-of-education-technology/[https://perma.cc/N22C-526A].
52

60
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schools would teach computer literacy (the basic
skills of using a computer). 58 If the goal was to
improve instructional efficiency, the computer could
be used as a tool. 59 Or, as is now seen and exemplified
first with the virtual charter school, the computer can
be used to connect students to the virtual classroom
and their teacher.
Most of the public had some familiarity with
remote learning by the time fifty million students
were pushed into eLearning by the emergence of a
global pandemic. 60 Many school districts in Indiana
began using eLearning days prior to the onset of the
pandemic as part of an Indiana Department of
Education program that permitted schools to use
eLearning in lieu of losing a school day to inclement
weather or planned teacher in-service days. 61 The
prevalence of eLearning leads to the fundamental
question: is digital technology still categorically a
curricular material? Is it still used primarily as a tool
for learning, or has it morphed into the actual means
by which students access their education? It is
difficult to argue with the idea that technology used
for education underwent a paradigmatic shift from a
curricular material into the sole access that students
had to their classroom and thus education. Many
students have been unable to access their teacher and
58

Id.
Id.
60
Tawnell D. Hobbs & Lee Hawkins, The Results Are In
for Remote Learning: It Didn’t Work, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/schools-coronavirus-remotelearning-lockdown-tech-11591375078[https://perma.cc/V3YTC2CS].
61
IND. CONST., supra note 4. See also Ind. Dep’t. of Educ.,
eLearning Day Program, https://perma.cc/7XSL-BH75 (June 7,
2020).
59

61
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classroom unless they were connected with a
computer across the Internet. 62
Indiana currently places digital content and
computer hardware and software within its
curricular materials statute:
‘Curricular
materials’
means
systematically organized material
designed to provide a specific level
of instruction in a subject matter
category, including: (1) books; (2)
hardware that will be consumed,
accessed, or used by a single student
during a semester or school year;
(3) computer software; and (4)
digital content.” 63

This language was added to the education statutes by
the legislature in 2013 in replacing the specific
“textbook” rental fee statutes with the more
generalized “curricular materials.” 64 By doing so, it
permitted schools to charge for the computers and
personal devices they loaned to students. When
technology is used as a supplemental tool for
educational purposes, the definition Indiana uses is
understandable as a categorization akin to textbooks.
However, for many students in Indiana currently, the
classroom doors and instruction are only accessible
via a Zoom link. 65 This shift was recognized in a

Hobbs, supra note 59.
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-18-2-2.7 (West 2020).
64
2013 Ind. Legis. Serv. 286-2013 (West).
65
In-person or Online? Here’s how Indiana Schools are
Reopening in COVID-19 Pandemic, WISHTV,,
https://www.wishtv.com/news/indiana-news/list-how-indianapublic-schools-reopen-during-covid-19-pandemic/ (Aug. 7, 2020,
6:55 PM). [https://perma.cc/F2TK-M2ME].
62
63

62
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release from the Indiana Department of Education. 66
The Department provided guidance to district
superintendents and administrators specifically for
the rental of Wi-Fi hotspots, without which many
students would not have access to learning. 67
IDOE does not believe school
officials should assess a fee to
provide access to Wi-Fi or a hotspot.
Curricular material rental fees are
designed to provide instructed
materials for a specific course and
not just general Wi-Fi access. The
CARES Act provides additional
funds to school corporations and
charter schools that affords them
the flexibility on how fiscal
resources are used. Because many
school corporations and charter
schools have transitioned to a
different learning platform to
provide
remote
learning
opportunities for students, schools
might consider utilizing CARES Act
funds for the additional expense
incurred. 68

Put differently, the Indiana Department of Education
recognized the shift that technology experienced and

66
Ind. Dep’t. of Educ., Curricular Material Rental
Related to Issues Due to COVID-19, (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/news/april-17-curricularmaterials-and-covid-190420.pdf?utm_content=&utm_medium=email&utm_name=&utm_
source=govdelivery&utm_term=[https://perma.cc/HWF3-5UC9].
67
Id.
68
Id.

63

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2021

13

BYU Education & Law Journal, Vol. 2021, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2

BYU Education & Law Journal

[2021

provided guidance that schools should not assess a
fee to students for providing mere access to their
education. 69 However, the guidance still recognizes
that the current statutes would likely permit the
assessment of these fees. 70
Prior to the mandatory shift to online learning
due to the public health concerns, technology was
already moving towards a reality in which it was a
primary vehicle or learning platform through which
students accessed the classroom. 71 Importantly,
many students were not being given the same
opportunity to these digital learning opportunities
because of concerns that students did not have the
necessary resources to access them when they were
home. 72 If students are not able to access the
classroom except through a digital device and a
connection to the Internet, technology is no longer
just a curricular material or tool. It has morphed into
the only means to access education, and, therefore, a
necessary component.
C. Structural Inequalities

69

See id.
Id.
71
Amina Fazlullah & Stephanie Ong, The Homework
Gap: Teacher Perspectives on Closing the Digital Divide,
COMMON SENSE MEDIA, 7 ( 2019),
https://www.commonsensemedia.org/sites/default/files/uploads/kid
s_action/homework-gap-report-2019.pdf; Audio tape: Dr. Shawn
Smith, held by Metropolitan School District Lawrence Township
(Dec. 17, 2020) (on file with author) (Dr. Smith noted that prior to
the pandemic Lawrence Township Schools were investing in
digital learning resources such as Canvas and Seesaw –
applications in which students were receiving their assignments,
communicating with their teachers and peers, and completing their
coursework).
72
Id.
70

64
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Many students do not have access to home
internet, and many school districts were left
scrambling to provide Wi-Fi hotspots in order to
account for this. 73 “Broadband availability has been
at the heart of the digital divide with an estimated
21.3 million people lacking access in 2019,” 74 and as
many as “15 percent of all households with schoolage children lack a high-speed internet connection.” 75
This disproportionately falls on black, Hispanic, and
low-income households. 76 “Overall, 17% of teens say
they are often or sometimes unable to complete
homework assignments because they do not have
reliable access to a computer or internet connection,”
with as many as 25% of black teens responding the
Olga Khazan, America’s Terrible Internet is Making
Quarantine Worse, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/08/virtuallearning-when-you-dont-haveinternet/615322/.[https://perma.cc/26GQ-LBEV].
74
Nicol Turner Lee, What the coronavirus reveals about
the digital divide between schools and communities, BROOKINGS
(Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/03/17/what-thecoronavirus-reveals-about-the-digital-divide-between-schools-andcommunities/ [https://perma.cc/6GZP-CZSM] (citing Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC-19-44, BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT
REPORT (2019),https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-1944A1.pdf).
75
Khazan, supra note 72; Monica Anderson & Andrew
Perrin, Nearly one-in-five teens can’t always finish their homework
because of the digital divide, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 26,
2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/26/nearlyone-in-five-teens-cant-always-finish-their-homework-because-ofthe-digital-divide/[https://perma.cc/PN2A-LYAE].
76
Monica Anderson & Andrew Perrin, Nearly one-in-five
teens can’t always finish their homework because of the digital
divide, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/26/nearly-one-infive-teens-cant-always-finish-their-homework-because-of-thedigital-divide/[https://perma.cc/PN2A-LYAE].
73

65
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same. 77 This digital divide has come to be known as
“the homework gap” as it relates to education. 78
“Roughly one-in-five black teens (21%) report having
to at least sometimes use public Wi-Fi,” which results
in teachers in Title I schools assigning less work that
requires digital devices or broadband internet. 79 This
directly impacts digital literacy, which will be a
growing concern as digital technology continues to
pervade and become more and more a part of our
daily lives.
The digital divide became front and center for
many school districts that suddenly had to transition
to online learning in the spring of 2020 due to the
coronavirus. 80 As the pandemic unfolded, the digital
divide in Indiana was apparent for Indianapolis
Public Schools (IPS). 81 By their own survey, IPS
estimated that close to 40% of their students did not
have access to home internet to support eLearning. 82
IPS bought 14,000 Chromebooks and 7,000 iPads,
and spent another $3 million for mobile hotspot
77

Id.
Id.
79
Id.; Fazlullah, supra note 70.
80
Bree Dusseault & Travis Pillow, Still No Consistent
Plan for Remote Learning for Hundreds of Thousands of Students
at Some of America's Biggest School Districts, CRPE (May 15,
2020), https://www.crpe.org/thelens/still-no-consistent-planremote-learning-hundreds-thousands-students-some-americasbiggest[https://perma.cc/95FD-5DLW].
81
Arika Herron, Schools, donors rush to fill ‘digital
divide’ and keep students learning during closures, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/education/2020/04/13/corona
virus-indiana-schools-donors-rush-fill-digitaldivide/5134559002/[https://perma.cc/RHF6-5VZN](Apr. 15,
2020).
82
Id.
78

66
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services. 83 This is not only the case for Indiana’s
largest school system. A study by Ball State
University’s Center for Business and Economic
Research shows that nearly eighty-four thousand
students in Indiana may lack home internet access. 84
Importantly, the study recognized that “[t]he absence
of broadband access also disproportionately affected
students in families with characteristics that already
challenge academic success.” 85 The study estimated
“that the absence of internet availability resulted in a
significant widening of the achievement gap between
individual students and schools.” 86
Further, many students simply did not show
up to remote learning in the spring, and many
students are still missing as of the start of the fall
semester. 87 In the fall, “73 percent of the 100 largest
U.S. school districts had chosen remote learning only
as their back-to-school instructional model, affecting
more than 8 million students,” and it left many
Rafael Sánchez & Shakkira Harris, Indianapolis Public
Schools to buy 21K laptops and iPads for students, WRTV,
https://www.wrtv.com/news/coronavirus/covid-19education/indianapolis-public-schools-to-buy-21k-laptops-andipads-for-students[https://perma.cc/5NNB-TP8W](Apr. 30, 2020,
6:22 PM).
84
Srikant Devaraj et al., How Many School-Age Children
Lack Internet Access in Indiana?, CTR. FOR BUS. AND ECON. RSCH.,
6 (July 9, 2020), https://projects.cberdata.org/reports/CovidInternetAccess-20200709.pdf[https://perma.cc/E4PG-3K5J].
85
Id. at 8.
86
Id.
87
Mark Lieberman, Why Students Still Can't Access
Remote Learning: How Schools Can Help, EDUCATION WEEK
(Sep. 15, 2020),
https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/DigitalEducation/2020/09/student
s_virtual_learning_access_gaps_new_year.html[https://perma.cc/F
TP6-8NF6].
83
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districts scrambling to find devices and hotspots to
distribute to their students. 88
Differences in educational opportunities lead
to different outcomes for these students. Research
based on absenteeism prior to the pandemic and the
typical educational losses experienced over the
summer for students projected that students would
return to the fall 2020 school year “with
approximately 63-68% of the learning gains in
reading relative to a typical school year, and with 3750% of the learning gains in math.” 89 These losses
were considered to be an upper bounds that did not
factor in potential home schooling and online
instruction. 90 However, as demonstrated, many
students did not have access to the needed resources,
and many teachers have reported significant
absenteeism with online learning. 91 The study
evidences the expected learning losses and accounts
for potential gains for the higher performing students
which may further widen the existing gap. 92
Education policies should be developed to
counteract the learning losses that are expected
across the board. Beyond that, policies should be
developed to address the gap that may continue to
widen for students that have additional resources or
even the necessary resources (internet and a digital
device) to continue to learn during virtual learning.
The digital divide and the expected learning losses
show that these necessary resources are just that –
88

Id.
Megan Kuhfeld et al., Projecting the potential impacts
of COVID-19 school closures on academic achievement,
ANNENBERG INSTITUTE AT BROWN UNIVERSITY,
https://www.edworkingpapers.com/sites/default/files/ai20-226v2.pdf[https://perma.cc/Z66S-PKYF].
90
Id.
91
Hobbs, supra note 59.
92
Kuhfeld, supra note 88.
89
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necessary. Indiana legislative authority should be
used to ensure that these materials are provided for
every student. If the legislature does not act to
alleviate the disparities for students who are learning
remotely, then it may be necessary to bring an action
to compel the legislature to address the disparity.
This brings us to the next section - whether it is
constitutionally permissible in Indiana to charge
students these fees under Indiana law.
D. Curricular materials or tuition under Indiana case
law

With many Indiana students solely accessing
their educations through eLearning, it is important to
consider whether this learning platform has
remained just a tool for learning or whether it has
become something more akin to “the act or business
of teaching the various branches of learning.” 93 Put
another way, can Indiana permissibly charge a rental
fee for a device without which a student would not be
able to access their teachers, classrooms, and
instruction? Or, has it become a non-permissible
charge for tuition?
Under the Chandler and Nagy holdings the
Indiana Supreme Court has said that schools cannot
charge a general fee for instruction or for attending
school. The Indiana courts have also shown that the
Education Clause defers significant discretion to the
legislature to determine “what will and what will not
come within the meaning of a public education
system.” 94 But this discretion certainly cannot be

Chandler v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 312 N.E.2d 915,
920 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
94
Nagy ex rel. Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch.
Corp., 844 N.E.2d 481, 491 (Ind. 2006).
93
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limitless, specifically where that discretion “run[s]
afoul of the Constitution.” 95 For example, it runs afoul
of the constitution for a school district to charge a fee
that goes into its general fund. 96 Likewise, it would be
assumed that the legislature would run afoul of the
constitution if it were to charge a general fee for
students to attend school. The issue comes down to
one simple question, “whether the fee constitute[s]
charging tuition.” 97
The possibility of the pandemic, and,
therefore, education taking place solely through
virtual platforms, were clearly not on the minds of the
legislature when they permitted schools to charge a
rental fee for technology. In 2013, classrooms were
generally using devices and technology as an
educational tool similar to textbooks (provided the
school was not a virtual charter school). Now, many
students cannot access their education without these
devices, since “when the technology is not simply
instructional support . . . the technology clearly
becomes essentially necessary.” 98 Like Nagy,
charging fees for technology during this period of
eLearning and beyond is charging fees for something
“the legislature or the State Board has already
determined [is] part and parcel of a public school
education and by extension qualif[ies] for public
funding,” because it is charging for access to
Hoagland v. Franklin Township Cmty. Sch. Corp., 27
N.E.3d 737, 745 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Meredith v. Pence, 984
N.E.2d 1213, 1222 (Ind. 2013)).
96
Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 493.
97
Hoagland, 27 N.E.3d at 744 (citing Nagy, 844 N.E.2d
at 483).
98
Taurus Myhand, A Dream Still Deferred: The
Unlawful Use of Student Fees for Instructional Technology in an
Alabama Public School Causing a Disparate Impact for Minority
Children, 19 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 77, 84 (2018).
95
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instruction and teaching. 99 One may have been able
to argue that when technology remained a tool that
aided in the education of students it remained
permissible to charge a fee as found in Chandler. But
once students could no longer access basic
instruction from their teachers without this tool, the
fee became a charge not only for the device but for
the instruction as well. Thus, the fee became an
unconstitutional charge “because it [is] equivalent to
being charged for attending a public school and
obtaining a public education.” 100
If schools took a complete laissez-faire
approach to learning in this environment, students
with resources necessary to connect them with their
classrooms would be able to access their education
while those without such resources would be denied
access. By continuing to permit schools to charge for
these devices, the legislature may as well be charging
students a general fee for access to their education,
because for many students there is no alternative.

II.

SCHOOL FEES PERMITTED UNDER THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provided plaintiffs the opportunity to
challenge unequal education opportunities in the
first half of the twentieth century, culminating in
Brown v. Board of Education. 101 In overturning the
99

Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 492.
Hoagland, 27 N.E.3d at 744 (citing Nagy, 844 N.E.2d

100

at 493).

See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337
(1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631
(1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
101
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separate but equal doctrine pronounced in Plessy v.
Ferguson 102 as applied to education, the Court
recognized education as “perhaps the most
important
function
of
state
and
local
governments.” 103 While recognizing “the importance
of education to our democratic society,” Brown did
not recognize education as a fundamental right. 104
Foundationally, it is imperative to understand
what is meant by a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution, and what is accomplished by
recognizing
it
as
such.
Put
simply,
“constitutionalizing a right provides a constitutional
floor” 105 and potentially provides “a basic set of
educational necessities—from qualified teachers, to
contemporary schoolbooks and buildings, to
remedial programs and specialized forms of
instruction—necessary to enable every child to reach
a basic level of achievement.” 106 Or, as the Framers
may have intended, “a fundamental right to
education requires the state to provide individuals
with skills to comprehend the political discourse of
the day, evaluate its merits, and then act thoughtfully
through the ballot and other means of
accountability.” 107 In another way, a recognition of a
fundamental right to education provided by the
Constitution would provide a bare minimum
protection for citizens to ensure that right. 108
102
103

(1954).

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493

104

Id.
Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to
an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 151 (2013).
106
Id. at 149.
107
Derek W. Black, The Fundamental Right to Education,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1059, 1109 (2019).
108
See id.
105

72
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byu_elj/vol2021/iss1/2

22

Smith: Indiana's Uniform School System, The Right to Literacy, and Remot

1]

Indiana’s Uniform School System

A. Education Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Leading to Kadrmas

Throughout the second half of the twentieth
century, advocates continued to press the Supreme
Court towards recognizing education as a
fundamental right. In what may have been the most
direct appeal for such a fundamental right, school
children and parents in San Antonio challenged the
unequal funding of school districts in Texas. 109 The
parents challenged Texas’ district-by-district
property tax method which led to “notable
differences in levels of local expenditure for
education.” 110 For comparison, the plaintiffs’ schools
were funded at a rate of $356 per student, while
students from a neighboring district were funded at
$594 per student. 111
In determining to use rational basis instead of
a stricter form of scrutiny, Rodriguez recognizes that
education “is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under our Federal Constitution.” 112 Part of
that calculus was the Court’s finding that the students
had “not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the
desired benefit.” 113 The parents presented an
argument that education “bears a peculiarly close
relationship to other rights and liberties accorded
protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they
insist[ed] that education is itself a fundamental
personal right because it is essential to the effective
exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to
109

(1973).

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1

Id. at 8.
Id. at 12–13.
112
Id. at 35.
113
Id. at 23.
110
111
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intelligent utilization of the right to vote.” 114 Despite
not articulating education as a fundamental right
with its decision, the court left this as a possibility by
noting that when “levels of educational expenditures
. . . provide an education that falls short” it could be
“conceded that some identifiable quantum of
education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite
to the meaningful exercise of [other] right[s].” 115
In 1982, alien school children brought
suit against a Texas statute that denied
“undocumented school-age children the free public
education that it provides to children who are
citizens of the United States or legally admitted
aliens.” 116 The difference between Plyler and
Rodriguez is not difficult to discern. The plaintiffs in
Plyler were absolutely deprived access to education
unless they paid a tuition fee. 117 The Court held that
“if the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent
children the free public education that it offers to
other children residing within its borders, that denial
must be justified by a showing that it furthers some
substantial state interest.” 118 The Court went on to
note:
Public Education is not a “right”
granted to individuals by the
Constitution. But neither is it merely
some
governmental
“benefit”
indistinguishable from other forms
of social welfare legislation. Both
the importance of education in
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36–37.
116
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
117
Id. at 206 n.2.
118
Id. at 230.
114
115
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maintaining our basic institutions,
and the lasting impact of its
deprivation on the life of the child,
mark the distinction. 119

The Court went further to say, “some degree of
education is necessary to prepare citizens to
participate effectively and intelligently in our open
political system.” 120 In applying a stricter form of
scrutiny, the Court did not recognize the plaintiffs as
a “suspect class,” nor was “education a fundamental
right.” 121 Nevertheless, the Court held the Texas law
to a stricter scrutiny when balancing countervailing
“costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who
are its victims,” when the law “den[ies] these children
a basic education.” 122
In consideration of these two rulings, the
Court had not precluded the possibility of the
existence to a fundamental right as distinguished
later in Papasan v. Allain. 123 The Court in Papasan
noted, “this Court has not yet definitively settled the
questions whether a minimally adequate education is
a fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to
discriminatorily infringe that right should be
accorded heightened equal protection review.” 124
In what is perhaps the clearest case in which
the Supreme Court reviewed the permissiveness of
fees for education, a child and mother challenged a
North Dakota policy that allowed “some local school
boards, but not others, to assess a fee for transporting
119
120

(1972)).

Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221

Id. at 223.
Id. at 223–24.
123
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986).
124
Id.
121
122
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pupils between their homes and the public
schools.” 125 The Court used rational basis scrutiny to
uphold the North Dakota policy because the statute
“discriminates against no suspect class and interferes
with no fundamental right.” 126 The Court found the
fundamental right argument flawed here partly
because the Court had still not “accepted the
proposition that education is a ‘fundamental right,’”
and partly because Sarita Kadrmas, “continued to
attend school during the time she was denied access
to the school bus.” 127 “Kadrmas effectively precludes
a challenge to school fees in the Supreme Court,
unless a child is absolutely denied the right to an
education and no alternative means for protecting
that right are provided.” 128 Since Kadrmas, litigation
against state statutory schemes that permit schools
to charge student fees has been largely relegated to
state courts. 129
Without the recognition of a fundamental
right, an equal protection claim for technology fees
would necessarily have to follow what has been
established under these precedents. The Court has
recognized at least partially that an altogether denial
of access to a basic education may invoke a stricter
form of scrutiny. 130 Following Plyler’s holding, the
Court would likely invalidate a state statute that
permits a school district to charge a tuition fee to a
class of persons that would otherwise deny them the
opportunity to attend school. The paradigmatic shift
125

(1988).

Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 452

Id. at 465.
Id. at 458.
128
Holly J. Foster, School Fees in Public Education, 1993
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 149, 155.
129
Id. at 156.
130
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982).
126
127
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that technology has undergone to become the
essential access point for children and their
educations may be considered as tuition. 131 But, like
Kadrmas, it may be difficult to demonstrate that the
fee itself is discriminatory if the student is not
actually denied receiving their education. The
alternative means that a student may be provided
would be what controls the outcome of the case. Like
Indiana, a complete denial to the access of education
is perhaps the bright line rule that both the Federal
and the Indiana Constitutions protect. So, when a
student continues to have access by other means, the
current structure of federal education law does not
protect these interests, which is yet another reason
to further explore whether the Constitution provides,
or should provide for, a fundamental right to
education.
B. Curricular Fees with a Fundamental Right to
Education following Gary B.

On April 23, 2020, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that “[a]ccess to a foundational level of
literacy—provided through public education—has
an extensive historical legacy and is so central to our
political and social system as to be ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.’” 132 The court stated that
“a basic minimum education has a longstanding
presence in our history and tradition, and is essential
to our concept of ordered constitutional liberty . . .
this suggests it should be recognized as a
See supra Part I.
Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 642 (6th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21
(1997)).
131
132
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fundamental right.” 133 “In short, without the literacy
provided by a basic minimum education, it is
impossible to participate in our democracy.” 134
Subsequently, the opinion was vacated to be reheard
en banc by the Sixth Circuit, but the parties settled
before it was reheard. 135 “Although an en banc court
vacated the ruling, the decision remains a roadmap
for other federal courts if they decide to offer
constitutional protection to children provided lowquality educational opportunities and outcomes.” 136
While no longer valid law, the Gary B. decision
sets out a possible new path in challenging
inadequate education by first noting, “the Supreme
Court has specifically distinguished and left open
‘whether a minimally adequate education is a
fundamental right.’” 137 Gary B. provides a roadmap
for future courts to answer this open question by,
“[a]pplying the substantive due process framework
from Glucksberg and Obergefell, and looking to the
reasoning of Rodriguez and Plyler . . . .” 138 Gary B. may
no longer be valid law in the Sixth Circuit, but it will
undoubtedly serve for other similarly situated
Id. at 649.
Id. at 642.
135
Gary B. v. Whitmer, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020);
Colter Paulson, Sixth Circuit Vacates Right-to-Literacy Ruling,
NAT’L L. REV. (June 11, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/sixth-circuit-vacates-rightto-literacy-ruling [https://perma.cc/9D5U-DEZ2].
136
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Designing the
Architecture to Protect Education as a Civil Right, 96 IND. L. J. 51,
54 (2020) (writing that a dual federal and state approach may be
needed to “work synergistically to protect education as a civil
right”).
137
Gary B., 957 F.3d at 644 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986)).
138
Id. at 648.
133
134
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students to challenge whether the Constitution
provides a right to access literacy. 139
The Gary B. opinion looks at the Supreme
Court education cases and finds that “whether a basic
education—meaning one that plausibly provides
access to literacy—is a fundamental right,” is still an
open question under the Due Process Clause. 140 In
determining whether a fundamental right exists, the
court used frameworks provided in Glucksberg and
Obergefell, 141 beginning by “examining our Nation’s
history, legal traditions, and practices.” 142 The court’s
review of the historical record revealed “that stateprovided education is ubiquitous throughout all but
the earliest days of the United States, a historical fact
that today leads its citizens to expect a basic public
education as of right.” 143 Significantly, “[a]n
astonishing thirty-six out of thirty-seven states in
1868 . . . imposed a duty in their constitutions to
provide a public-school education.” 144 Further, the
court found that “[t]he continued expansion of
education through the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment resulted in universal compulsory
education by 1918,” 145 such that now “it is certainly

139
See Christine M. Naassana, Comment, Access to
Literacy Under the United States Constitution, 68 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1215 (2020).
140
Gary B., 957 F.3d at 648.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 649 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S.
702, 710 (1997)).
143
Id. at 648.
144
Id. at 649–50 (quoting Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E.
Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions when the
Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are
Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 108 (2008)).
145
Id. at 650 (citing Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The
Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
92 (2013)).
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both so longstanding and uniform as to be taken for
granted in twenty-first-century America.” 146 The
history of Supreme Court cases addressing the
historical discriminatory practice of school
segregation further illustrates the importance of
recognizing education as a fundamental right,
culminating in two main takeaways. 147
First, access to literacy was viewed
as a prerequisite to the exercise of
political power, with a strong
correlation between those who
were viewed as equal citizens
entitled to self-governance and
those who were provided access to
education by the state. Second,
when faced with exclusion from
public
education,
would-be
students have repeatedly been
forced to rely on the courts for
relief. 148

The court used this analysis to affirm that the
Constitution provides this right, that it gives “all
students at least a fair shot at access to literacy—the
minimum level of education required to participate
in our nation’s democracy.” 149 For the students in
Gary B., the allegation of a lack of books and materials,
lack of proficiency in statewide tests, insufficient and
inadequate teachers, along with deteriorating
conditions of the physical buildings, were enough to
reverse the lower court’s decision on the motion to
146

Id.
Id. at 651.
148
Id. at 651–52.
149
Id. at 660.
147
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dismiss when alleging that they had not been
provided access to a basic minimum education. 150
Finding a fundamental right to
education is only part of the process, applying it is
another. The Gary B. court acknowledged this
explicitly in that “it would be difficult to define the
exact limits of what constitutes a basic minimum
education sufficient to provide such access.” 151 But
the court did provide guidance in that “it would seem
to include at least three basic components: facilities,
teaching, and educational materials (e.g., books).” 152
Access to education is the underlying
theme throughout all of the federal cases, and the
Gary B. court recognized this. Not only would the
fundamental right to a bare minimum education as
recognized in Gary B. provide a means to ensuring
that children are provided access to the necessary
education infrastructure during a global pandemic,
but it explicitly provides for materials within its
holding.
C. A Fundamental Right to a Minimum Education in
Indiana

Looking to Indiana’s Education Clause
may provide for a similar argument to the one made
in Gary B. for a minimum standard of education,
although varying from what has been discussed
relating to curricular material fees. 153 The Education
Clause in Indiana’s constitution provides “for a
general and uniform system of Common Schools.” 154
Id. at 660–61.
Id. at 659.
152
Id. at 660.
153
See supra Part I.
154
IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
150
151
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Merriam-Webster’s first definition for “uniform” is
“having always the same form, manner, or degree:
not varying or variable.” 155 However, as Nagy
instructs, the framers of the clause may have used
“uniform” in a dramatically different connotation. 156
The Nagy court was more interested in deciphering
what the framers intended with “tuition shall be
without charge,” but part of the decision is
instructive. 157 “[T]he evils of the old system which
were intended to be avoided by the new
constitution—[were] inequality in education,
inequality in taxation, lack of uniformity in schools,
and a shrinking from legislative responsibilities . . .
.” 158
The Indiana Supreme Court more
closely examined the uniformity in which the
common school system should operate under the
Education Clause in Bonner. 159 Public school students
brought suit against Mitch Daniels, the governor of
Indiana at the time, as well as against the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction and several
other Indiana education officials. 160 The students
were seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Education Clause imposes a duty to provide a
standard quality education to public school
students. 161 The court quickly pointed out that the

Uniform, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (March 7, 2021),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/uniform.
156
Nagy ex rel. Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School
Corp., 844 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 2006).
157
Id. at 491.
158
Id. (quoting Greencastle Twp. in Putnam County v.
Black, 5 Ind. 557, 564 (Ind. 1854), overruled in part by Robinson
v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, 1 N.E. 698 (Ind. 1885)).
159
Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516
(Ind. 2009).
160
Id.
161
Id. at 518.
155
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Plaintiffs’ complaint did not allege a violation of the
“general and uniform” requirements of the clause. 162
The court found that the Education Clause places two
duties on the General Assembly. 163 “The first is the
duty to encourage moral, intellectual, scientific, and
agricultural improvement. The second is the duty to
provide for a general and uniform system of open
common schools without tuition.” 164 The second duty
is “more concrete” and “[j]udicial enforceability is
more plausible” than the first. 165
Despite granting that the second duty
may provide for judicial enforceability, the court
went on to dismiss the idea that any standard of
educational achievement is mandated. 166 Put plainly,
“[t]he Clause says nothing whatsoever about
educational quality.” 167 The Bonner opinion,
however, does not explain what the framers meant by
“uniform.” 168 Justice Boehm offered in concurrence,
“article 8, section 1 of the Indiana Constitution is of
the same general structure as the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal
Privileges Clause of the Indiana Constitution.” 169 The
comparison is apt in that both the Equal Protection
Clause and the Education Clause have yet to hold a
particular level of quality or adequacy in education to
be imposed by their respective authorities. 170 The

Id. at 520.
Id.
164
Id. (emphasis altered from original).
165
Id.
166
Id. at 521.
167
Id.
168
See id. at 520-22.
169
Id. at 523. (Boehm, J. concurring) (“The General
Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens,
privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not
equally belong to all citizens.”(IND. CONST. art. I, § 23.))
170
Id.
162
163
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Education
Clause
should
“treat
citizens
evenhandedly,” but it does not dictate the substance
of education, and, therefore “does not mandate any
judicially enforceable standard of quality.” 171
Inherently, “uniform” and “equal” suggest that
some semblance of likeness among schools should
exist. Once a program is undertaken that is said to be
equal or uniform, the nature of the words dictates by
reason that there should be a non-zero irreducible
minimum of likeness. On the one hand, it may be
unreasonable to expect educational outcomes to be
identical at every school system across the state or
country. But that raises the question of what an
acceptable deviation in educational outcomes could
be maintained while the school systems are said to
remain uniform or equal. As differences in
educational attainment grow farther and farther
apart, at what point are school systems no longer
uniform? 172 Gary B. is illustrative in that systems that
do not provide even a plausible chance to attain
literacy would likely not be uniform to a school
system that graduates nearly 80% of their students
prepared for college. 173 And as Bonner notes, there is
plausibility for judicial enforceability if the
educational system the Indiana Generally Assembly
prescribes does not provide for a minimum level of
uniformity among the system of schools that the
Education Clause mandates. 174
171

Id.
But see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 82-90 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Dispensing with the notion of gross inadequacy or a minimum
level of education, but instead focusing on inequality of
educational opportunity that raises a question of denial of equal
protection of the laws).
173
Gary B., 957 F.3d at 662.
174
Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 520.
172
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While eLearning continues as a primary
vehicle for education delivery, the prioritization of
access to the necessary devices is a fundamental
prerequisite. With local school districts taking
different approaches, depending on resources
available to the school and district, these approaches
may be what differentiates between one class of
students versus another set of students, and may end
up serving as an equal protection basis to challenge
fees. Plyler, Rodriguez, and Kadrmas may provide just
enough protection to recognize that fees charged to
students for mere digital access to their classrooms
and teachers would be violative of the Equal
Protection
Clause.
However,
providing
a
constitutional right to education similar to Gary B., of
which educational materials are a necessary part,
would provide what is actually needed in our current
reality and an access to a more equal education for all
in the future as well.

III.

SOLUTIONS

Before jumping directly to a legal challenge,
there are other potentially productive solutions that
could serve as a viable option to remediate the
curricular material fee issue. School districts in
Indiana could, by the permissive nature of the statute,
choose not to rent but to pay for the materials within
their budgets. 175 Another option would be for the
Indiana General Assembly to reform the statute to
provide for these materials across the state for all
Indiana schoolchildren. 176 If these options turn out to
Ind. Code Ann. § 20-26-12-2 (West 2020).
See H.B. 1169, 120th Gen. Assemb. Second Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2018); H.B. 1430, 121st Gen. Assemb., Second Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2020).
175
176
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not be as viable as one might hope, there is always the
option to bring a claim to challenge the
constitutionality of the fee under both the Indiana
Education Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. District-level Reforms

Within what is currently permitted under
Indiana statute, there is enough room for school
districts to supply the necessary technological
equipment without charge. The structure of the
curricular materials statute is permissive in its
language, “The governing body may rent the
curricular materials to students enrolled . . .” 177 Of
course, this decision of whether the district chooses
to use these rental schemes is largely a budgetary
decision. For example, kindergarteners in Taylor
Community School Corporation had their textbook
fees waived for the 2015-2016 school year. 178 In
2019, a cross section of central Indiana elementary
schools have fees that range from $50 at Madison
County’s Alexandria Community School Corporation
to $247 for fifth-grade students at Forest Glen
Elementary School. 179 Fees for the 2020 school year
for Lawrence Township schools in Indianapolis range
from $100 for kindergarten and go up to $248. 180
177

added).

Ind. Code Ann. § 20-26-12-2 (West 2020) (emphasis

Carson Gerber, Indiana School District Waives
Kindergartners’ Textbook Fee, ASSOCIATED PRESS, March 15,
2015.
179
London Gibson, These Schools Have the Highest
Textbook Fees: Indiana Allows Schools to Charge for Consumable
Fees, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sep. 8, 2019 at A2.
180
Curricular Resources Fees 2020-2021,
METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICT – LAWRENCE TOWNSHIP (Nov.
178
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Many school districts have seen donations
come in from private groups to fund the device
shortages they experienced in 2020, and still others
may use CARES Act funding to help alleviate the
financial strain. 181 Again, the Indiana Department of
Education promulgated guidelines to encourage
districts not to charge fees for the devices, but
ultimately the discretion is left with the local
governing body whether or not to assess fees. 182 This
may lead to wildly different outcomes across school
districts in Indiana. One school providing access to
education without charging fees, with another school
assessing fees for mere access, may materialize into
an equal protection claim, especially if some students
would otherwise have the virtual school doors closed
to them.
Keeping fees low or eliminating them
altogether also creates a budgetary problem, due to
the fact that “it can cost between $3 to $5 million up
front” for a district like Indianapolis Public Schools to
update their textbooks and other curricular
materials. 183 When posed with the question of
whether a district the size of Lawrence Township
could shoulder the financial burden of the curricular
materials within the district, Superintendent of
Schools Dr. Shawn Smith responded: “If we didn’t
charge for [those] materials, we would devastate our
27, 2020),
https://www.ltschools.org/MediaLibraries/ltschools.org/Document
s/District/Enrollment/2020-21-textbook-rental-fees.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8SYP-T3EM].
181
Herron, supra note 80.
182
Ind. Dep’t. of Educ., Curricular Material Rental
Related to Issues Due to COVID-19, supra note 65.
183
Gibson, supra note 178.
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curricular programs.” 184 “We would not be able to
have the depth in our curriculum that we have.” 185
School districts would consistently be faced with
budgetary choices in making these determinations
for curricula, particularly with regard to the newer
and more advanced courses they can offer to their
secondary school students. 186
Dr. Smith points out the power that would be
unleashed for schools if Indiana were to decide to
provide for curricular materials at the state level, and
notes as a result of the current statutory scheme that
curriculum “is not equal in all communities.” 187
Furthermore, Dr. Smith indicates that even before
COVID, technology had been introduced into their
daily educational instruction, and, as a result of
COVID, they have already heard that some parents
would prefer the school system to continue offering
eLearning options moving forward. 188
While the legislature may insist that they have
permitted schools to decide whether to charge these
fees or not, the evidence suggests otherwise. Schools
charge these fees because they are otherwise faced
with significant budgetary choices. Leaving this
permissive charge at the control of local school
governing bodies does not really give them the
control the statute presumes them to have. This
reality all but precludes this suggested reform from
being a viable strategy for addressing what may
fundamentally be a violation of Indiana’s, and
perhaps even the Federal, Constitution.
Interview with Dr. Shawn Smith, Superintendent,
Schools MSD Lawrence Twp., (Dec. 17, 2020) (recording on file
with author).
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
184
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B. Statutory Reforms
It is well within the constitutional authority of
the legislature as explained by Nagy that if they can
“place appropriate conditions or limitations on any
such funding” for curricular materials, they hold the
power to remove those “conditions or limitations.” 189
The former State Superintendent of Schools called for
Indiana to cover the cost of textbook rentals in 2014,
which the Indiana Department of Education
estimated would cost $109 million. 190 In 2018,
Indiana State Representative Scott Pelath proposed
doing just that in House Bill 1169. 191 The bill would
have created a fund that would provide schools
reimbursement for all curricular materials. 192
Instead, the bill died in committee, despite receiving
7,000 signatures on a Change.org petition. 193
In 2020, Rep. Ryan Hatfield of Evansville
authored House Bill 1430, which would have
eliminated curricular materials fees for students. 194
The bill would amend Ind. Code § 20-26-12-1 from
“rent” to “provide at no cost” the curricular materials
each school provides. 195 Further, the bill would have
established a “Curricular Materials Fund” which
Nagy ex rel. Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School
Corp., 844 N.E.2d 481, 492 (Ind. 2006).
190
Tom LoBianco, Ritz Proposes State Cover Cost of K12 Texts - $70 million More for Books Proposed in Schools
Budget, THE JOURNAL GAZETTE, Sep. 6, 2014 at 3C.
191
H.B. 1169, 120th Gen. Assemb. Second Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2018).
192
Id.
193
Gibson, supra note 178.
194
H.B. 1430, 121st Gen. Assemb., Second Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2020).
195
Id.
189
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would be funded by: “(1) Appropriations by the
General Assembly. (2) Donations. (3) Federal grants
or other federal appropriations. (4) Interest and
other earnings derived from investment of money in
the fund.” 196 Like HB 1169 in 2018, HB 1430 died in
committee, and as of January 2021, there has been no
proposed legislation in the current Indiana legislative
session that would address the current structure of
the curricular materials fee statute. In the meantime,
students across Indiana are still accessing their
classroom via Zoom, and are paying for the privilege
to do so.
C. Federal and State Challenges

As has been demonstrated, the current
method of accessing the classroom solely via
technology would be a formidable way of presenting
a claim to an Indiana court that these fees are no
longer being charged only as curricular materials, but
as a form of tuition. 197 The current situation is not all
that different from being charged a fee before being
allowed to enter a brick-and-mortar school building.
This challenge might seem moot if classrooms return
to something closer to what they were like prior to
2020, when technology was used as a tool more akin
to textbooks. But to those ends, the use of technology
in the classroom has become so pervasive that it is
unlikely that computers or other digital devices will
take a backseat to other curricular materials or other
forms of instruction. Additionally, the current reality
196

Id.
See Chandler v. South Bend Community School Corp.,
312 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Nagy ex rel. Nagy v.
Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 844 N.E.2d 481 (Ind.
2006).
197
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rips the veneer off of the permissible fees state
constitutional argument altogether. Dichotomizing
parts of education into what is part and parcel to be
considered chargeable as tuition is no longer tenable.
You cannot educate a child without a teacher as much
as you cannot educate a child without curriculum.
Requiring fees for or one and not the other is the
equivalent of requiring fees for both.
If the Indiana legislature is unwilling to
examine the curricular material fee statutes in the
current landscape, then a state constitutional claim
challenging the current fee statute should be
considered. This Note provides ample evidence that
the structure of the curricular materials fee statute is
no longer permissible under the Indiana
Constitution. As part of this claim, a challenge should
also focus on whether or not the current differences
in curriculum between school systems has
materialized into a cognizable claim that the current
structure has not provided a “uniform” system of
schools. The focus of such a claim should also
explicitly challenge the notion of what was meant by
the framers’ inclusion of a “uniform” system.
It would also be possible to consider a federal
equal protection and substantive due process claim.
A federal claim would need to differ significantly
from Kadrmas to be sure, and Plyler and Gary B.
provide a compass if certain students are denied the
ability to access a minimum education. 198 For
example, how different are the students in Plyler who
were charged a fee just to attend school to students
who don’t have home internet access, are given the
necessary devices, and then subsequently charged
See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S.
450 (1988). But see Gary B v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 644 (6th
Cir. 2020).
198
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fees just to attend? Students who incidentally already
have home internet access would not be charged for
that particular device and are therefore not charged.
This disparate treatment may be enough to
materialize into an equal protection claim.
What is significantly different here from
Kadrmas is that Kadrmas was able to access the
classroom doors by alternative means, whereas some
students currently may be unable to connect to the
classroom, and are therefore unable to access the
classroom by alternative means. Furthermore, even if
a semblance of normalcy returns to the classroom,
the evidence is mounting that lack of access to
computer technology is causing a disparate impact
for students of color and low-income households.
CONCLUSION

The COVID pandemic has undoubtedly
exposed new challenges in education. However, the
reality is that it has also exposed pre-existing,
underlying systemic problems, and exacerbated
them to the point that the only responsible thing to
do would be to deal with them in earnest. For
curricular fees, specifically, permitting schools to
charge fees for technology and require their use to
access the classroom is running counter to the
statutory permissive scheme Indiana has in place,
likely past the point of being constitutional. Indiana
has shown a willingness in the past to demonstrate
that, at least for education, there really is no such
thing as a free lunch. Undeniably, it would take a
concerted legislative effort to change these
permissive fees.
As technology use in the classroom, or, more
accurately, technology put to use as a substitute for
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the classroom, continues to permeate education, it
will only continue to exacerbate the disparate impact
the lack of access to these resources has on certain
students. If a minimum education is found to be a
fundamental right, as in Gary B., this will have a
resounding impact on the ability for students to seek
an equal educational opportunity. As a fundamental
right, students will be able to enforce the minimum
education that would be required. Indiana’s
curricular materials fee statute would not be
permissive under a minimum education standard if
that standard requires curricular materials to be part
and parcel of a minimum education.
Education is fundamental to the functioning of
our democracy, and, as democratic citizens, we
should be making every effort to provide a minimum,
equal education to all students. As perhaps the
foremost twentieth century philosopher of
education, John Dewey, put it: “a government resting
upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless
those who elect and obey their governors are
educated.” 199 The best teachers, curriculum, and
other resources could be as close as a click away if the
technology develops enough to provide these
resources. In the current reality, it also has the
capability to produce unequal opportunities if
students are effectively shut out of the classroom
through lack of access. Internet and digital devices
have become a pillar in the classroom and an integral
component of a minimum education. If these
resources are not provided to students equally,
education will remain unequal as a result.
JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1916)
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/852/852-h/852h.htm#link2H_SUMM7 [https://perma.cc/99HZ-J8G6].
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